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ABSTRACT
In Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that a Web site operator loses the immunity granted by section
230 of the Communications Decency Act by materially contributing
to the alleged illegality of its third-party content. Subsequent case law
seems to reflect two different standards for determining when this
“underlying illegality” test is satisfied. Most courts have adopted a
narrow reading of Roommates.com, denying immunity only when a
Web site has explicitly requested illegal content. In NPS LLC v.
StubHub, Inc., however, a Massachusetts district court appears to
adopt a broader inducement-based standard that would impose
liability upon a much wider range of conduct. This Article examines
the recent case law in order to identify the contours of these differing
theories for negating § 230 immunity.
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INTRODUCTION
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA)1 protects
Web site operators from suits arising out of third-party content as long
as the operators are not partly responsible for the development of that
content.2 In Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com,3 the Ninth Circuit interpreted this to mean that a Web site
operator loses § 230 immunity when it materially contributes to the
underlying illegality of its third-party content.4
Subsequent case law, however, has not been entirely consistent in
its application of the “underlying illegality” test. Most cases seem to
indicate that the test is satisfied only when a defendant explicitly
requests the illegal material, a scenario found in FTC v. Accusearch
Inc.,5 but the recent decision in NPS LLC v. StubHub, Inc.6 suggests that
a wider range of conduct generates liability. These divergent
1

47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
See generally 4 RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY §
14:11 (4th ed. 2010).
3
Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521
F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
4
Id. at 1168.
5
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2009).
6
NPS LLC v. StubHub, Inc., 2009 WL 995483 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Jan. 26, 2009).
2
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approaches raise the possibility that two distinct standards have
emerged in the wake of Roommates.com: “solicitation,” which requires
an actual request by the Web site operator, and “inducement,” for
which implicit suggestions may be sufficient.7
This Article will first provide a brief overview of § 230 and the
early cases interpreting the provision. Next, the Article will describe
the “underlying illegality” limitation of Roommates.com and analyze the
recent case law that applies it. The Article will conclude by examining
the relationship between the solicitation and inducement approaches
and by discussing how they might affect future litigants.
I. BASIC OPERATION OF SECTION 230
The purpose behind section 230 of the Communications Decency
Act (CDA)8 was to both promote the free exchange of ideas over the
Internet and to encourage voluntary monitoring for offensive or
obscene material.9 The statute accomplishes these goals by ensuring
that those who merely provide an outlet or forum for third-party
speech over the Internet will not be held liable for any claims that may
arise out of the content of that speech.10
In determining whether a defendant is entitled to immunity under
§ 230(c)(1), courts engage in a three-part analysis.11 First, to receive
immunity, the defendant must be a “provider or user of an interactive
computer service,”12 which includes Web sites.13 Next, the cause of

7

For purposes of this Article, the words “solicitation” and “inducement” are
given specific meanings. These are not terms of art however; they are used here
merely as conventions. Cases applying Roommates.com have not explicitly defined
either term, nor have they drawn any clear distinction between the two. Indeed,
some courts appear to use the terms interchangeably.
8
47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
9
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003).
10
Section 230(c)(1) declares that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider.”
11
See, e.g. Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 418-22 (1st
Cir. 2007).
12
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006).
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action must be one that treats the defendant as the “publisher” or
“speaker” of the content at issue.14 Claims that would hold the
defendant liable in some other capacity are unaffected by § 230.15
Finally, the defendant will not be entitled to immunity if “responsible,
in whole or in part, for the creation or development”16 of the content
because the scope of § 230 extends only to third-party content. The
bulk of § 230 litigation concerns this third prong,17 but it appears that
recent cases have adopted differing approaches for determining
whether the defendant is a “content provider” under the Roommates.com framework.
II. THE PRE-ROOMMATES.COM UNDERSTANDING OF “CONTENT
PROVIDER”
Before Roommates.com, a Web site operator could engage in a wide
range of actions without being considered a “content provider.” Early
precedent established that immunity encompassed all “traditional
editorial functions,” including minor editing of spelling, grammar, and
length, as well as selecting which content to publish. 18 A Web site
operator would only face liability if it were to significantly alter the
meaning of the content. 19 Immunity also remained intact when the
13

The Internet itself qualifies as an “interactive computer service,” and
therefore, a defendant need only be a “user” of the Internet to satisfy the first prong
of the test. Because every Web site operator is necessarily an Internet user, this
requirement is rarely the subject of litigation. See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018,
1030-31 (9th Cir. 2003).
14
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006).
15
For example, in Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009), the
Ninth Circuit held that § 230 does not insulate a defendant against promissory
estoppel claims because liability under such claims is based on the defendant’s act of
making a promise, rather than its role as a publisher.
16
47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (2006) (defining “information content provider”).
17
David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of
Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 373, 454-55 (2010).
18
See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997). See also
Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031.
19
See Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031.
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Web site operator provided neutral tools for third parties to use in
creating their own content.20 Such tools included detailed questionnaires with pre-populated drop-down menus that allowed users to
create online profiles.21 These early developments reflected the notion
that § 230 conferred a “broad grant of immunity” on Web site
operators.22
III. ROOMMATES.COM AND THE “UNDERLYING ILLEGALITY” TEST
Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com is one
of the first decisions to place substantive limits on § 230 immunity.23
The defendant in Roommates.com provided an online community
where prospective renters and those with available housing could
connect with one another by searching user profiles and sending or
receiving email notifications.24 The profiles required users to disclose
their race, gender, sexual orientation, and whether or not they had
children, as well as their preferences for these same categories, all of
which are protected characteristics under the Fair Housing Act
(FHA).25 The Web site then allowed users to conduct searches based
on these illegal criteria.26 The Ninth Circuit denied § 230 protection
because the defendant had “developed” the content on users’ profiles
and the discriminatory results of their searches.27
In reaching this conclusion, the court adopted what has been

20

See, e.g. Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003).
See Id. at 1124. In concluding that these questionnaires did not render the
defendant a content provider of its users’ profiles, the court explained that “[n]o
profile has any content until a user actively creates it.”
22
See Curran v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2008 WL 472433, at *14 (S.D. W. Va. Feb.
19, 2008).
23
Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521
F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
24
Id. at 1161-62.
25
Id. at 1161. The Fair Housing Act generally makes it illegal to express any
preferences regarding a protected characteristic in the context of the sale or rental of
a dwelling. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2006).
26
Id. at 1167.
27
Id. at 1166-67.
21
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called the “underlying illegality”28 test: “[A] website helps to develop
unlawful content, and thus falls within the exception to section 230, if
it contributes materially to the alleged illegality of the conduct.”29 The
court explained that a Web site that merely provides the tools used to
create content nevertheless “materially contributes” to its illegality if
the tools themselves are designed to elicit or encourage its illegal
nature.30 Such tools effectively lose their “neutral” character and the
Web site operator is rendered a co-developer of the third-party content
resulting from their use. Rather than treating § 230 as a “broad grant
of immunity,” the holding in Roommates.com reinforces its limits by
establishing the boundary between providing “neutral tools” and being
actively involved in the development of a third party’s illegal speech.
However, while the underlying illegality test recognizes that a Web
site operator can be liable for any content it effectively causes a third
party to produce, it is unclear what types of actions will exert this
causal force. The uncertainty owes in large part to the vague and
varying articulations of the standard found throughout the Roommates.com opinion.31 Some language suggests that a Web site loses
immunity by simply encouraging an illegal aspect of its user-generated

28

This Article uses the term “underlying illegality” when referring to the
standard set forth in Roommates.com. See Lynn C. Percival, IV, The One-Sided
Voidability of Contracts Impacted by 47 U.S.C. § 230, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV.
(forthcoming 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1542423 (adopting this terminology). Other names have been suggested. See, e.g.
Bradford J. Sayler, Amplifying Illegality: Using the Exception to CDA Immunity Carved
Out By Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com to Combat
Abusive Editing Tactics, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 203 (2009) (the “amplifying illegality”
concept).
29
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1168.
30
Id. at 1172.
31
See Eric Goldman, Roommates.com Denied 230 Immunity by Ninth Circuit En
Banc (With My Comments), TECHNOLOGY AND MARKETING BLOG (April 3, 2008, 8:05
PM), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2008/04/roommatescom_de_1.htm
(discussing potential consequences of the opinion’s “myriad of ambiguities”).
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content.32 In other parts of the opinion, however, the court stresses
that the users who registered with Roommates.com were literally given
no choice but to express discriminatory preferences.33 Adding to the
confusion is the spectrum of terms the court uses, variously describing
content providers as those who “encourage,” “solicit,” “elicit,”
“induce,” “urge,” “prompt,” or “promote” unlawful speech. As might
be expected, decisions following Roommates.com have not applied the
underlying illegality test consistently. Instead, the case law seems to
reflect two different approaches to defining culpable behavior: one
based on “solicitation” and the other on “inducement.”
IV. THE SOLICITATION APPROACH
In a number of recent cases, courts appear to adopt what might be
termed a “solicitation standard” for evaluating whether a defendant
has materially contributed to the illegality of its third-party content.34
32

See, e.g., Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1167 (“Roommate’s search function is
similarly designed to steer users based on discriminatory criteria.”); Id. at 1172 (“The
salient fact in Carafano was that the website’s classifications of user characteristics did
absolutely nothing to enhance the defamatory sting of the messages, to encourage
defamation or to make defamation easier.”).
33
See, e.g., Id. at 1166, n.19 (“Roommate, of course, does much more than
encourage or solicit; it forces users to answer certain questions and thereby provide
information that other clients can use to discriminate unlawfully.”); Id. at 1170, n.26
(“But, it is Roommate that forces users to express a preference and Roommate that
forces users to disclose the information that can form the basis of discrimination by
others.”).
34
The emergence of a solicitation standard is evidenced by the many cases
interpreting the Roommates.com opinion narrowly and declining to extend its holding
to other fact patterns. The most critical factor, according to these cases, is that
Roommates.com required its users to provide discriminatory responses as a condition
of using the Web site. See, e.g. Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc.,
591 F.3d 250, 257 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Whereas the website in Roommates.com required
users to input illegal content as a necessary condition of use, Nemet has merely
alleged that Consumeraffairs.com structured its website and its business operations
to develop information related to class-action lawsuits.”). Many decisions also point
out that the questions themselves were discriminatory. See, e.g. Atl. Recording Corp.
v. Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“The Ninth
Circuit’s decision was based solely on the fact that the content on the website that
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This “solicitation” only occurs when the Web site operator explicitly
requests the content directly from the third party. Because the standard is premised on a narrow reading the Roommates.com opinion, a
defendant whose conduct rises to this level is likely to lose immunity
regardless of which standard is used.
A. Key Considerations Under a Solicitation Standard
The solicitation approach appears to have three defining characteristics. To be considered a “developer” of the offending content, a
Web site operator must make an explicit request for that content, the
request must be specific enough to exclude lawful material, and there
must be an illegal motive behind the request. A Web site operator that
solicits content in this manner is effectively expressing its own ideas by
enlisting a third party to supply the necessary material.
First, under a solicitation standard, a defendant’s actions would
need to rise to the level of an actual request; a Web site operator will
not lose immunity over material submitted in response to an implicit
suggestion. In Best Western International, Inc. v. Furber,35 visitors to the
defendant’s Web site wrote allegedly defamatory emails which the
defendant then posted online. The plaintiff sued, arguing that the
Web site “impliedly suggest[ed]” that visitors should make defamatory
statements, but the court flatly rejected this as a basis for denying
immunity.36 Instead, the court granted summary judgment in favor of
the defendant because the Web site did not “explicitly solicit tortious
material.”37
In addition to being explicit, a request must exhibit a certain
degree of specificity to constitute a material contribution under the
solicitation approach. Among courts that have taken this solicitation
was discriminatory was supplied by Roommates.com itself.”). See also Doe II v.
MySpace, Inc., 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 148, 158 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (distinguishing
Roommates.com by pointing out that MySpace’s profile questions were not
discriminatory and that MySpace did not require its members to answer them as a
condition of using the site).
35
Best Western Int’l, Inc. v. Furber, 2008 WL 4182827 (D. Ariz. Sep. 5, 2008).
36
Id. at *10
37
Id. at *10
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approach, immunity appears to be forfeited only when compliance
with the request almost necessarily entails providing unlawful content.38
The case law suggests two basic scenarios that would satisfy this
condition. In the first scenario, a Web site operator offers a range of
illegal content options and requires a third party to select from it. 39
The most frequently cited example of this scenario is the questionnaire
in Roommates.com, which required users to select discriminatory
answers from pre-populated drop-down menus. In the second scenario,
a Web site operator requests a specific kind of information that is
alleged to have illegal attributes. In Woodhull v. Meinel,40 for example,
the defendant asked a student-run newspaper for any information it
had about the plaintiff that she “disliked.” The plaintiff sued, claiming
that the information provided was defamatory. Though the request
itself would not seem to require an illegal response, the only content
that fit its description had an illegal quality. In such cases, it may be
difficult to determine whether the defendant solicited the content for
its legal properties or for its illegal properties.
Finally, as courts often conduct an inquiry into the motivation
behind the request, liability under a solicitation standard appears to
require an illegal intent.41 This intent might be inferred from the
38

See, e.g., Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 968 (N.D. Ill. 2009)
(“The phrase ‘adult,’ even in conjunction with ‘services,’ is not unlawful it itself nor
does it necessarily call for unlawful content.”). See also Joyner v. Lazzareschi, 2009
WL 695539, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. March 18, 2009) (finding that a defendant who
created titles for discussion threads on a message board did not “develop” any
defamatory postings because “[p]resumably, positive messages about plaintiff or
messages defending him could be and were posted under the foregoing, general
thread headings.”).
39
Examples of cases referencing this type of scenario include Atlantic Recording
Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), Dart v. Craigslist,
Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961 (N.D. Ill. 2009), Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d
1193 (N.D. Cal. 2009), and Doe II v. MySpace, Inc., 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 148 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2009).
40
Woodhull v. Meinel, 202 P.3d 126 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008).
41
For a discussion of this intentionality requirement in the FTC v. Accusearch
Inc. trial court opinion, see Recent Cases, Federal District Court Denies § 230 Immunity
to Website that Solicits Illicit Content: FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 121 HARV. L. REV. 2246
(2008). The author proposes a mens rea-based exception to CDA immunity.
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nature of the defendant’s operations or from the manner in which the
defendant uses the content.42 In Woodhull, the court found it relevant
that the stated purpose of the defendant’s Web site was “to make fun
of” the plaintiff, suggesting that the information had been solicited for
its defamatory character.43 Such inferences connect the defendant’s
actions to the illicit nature of the content, the key element introduced
by Roommates.com.
B. A Possible Example from the Tenth Circuit: FTC v. Accusearch
A recent case out of the Tenth Circuit provides an example of how
a defendant might lose immunity under a solicitation-based approach.
In Federal Trade Commission v. Accusearch Inc.,44 the defendant sold
private telephone records through its Web site, Abika.com.45 After a
customer placed an order, Accusearch would hire third-party
researchers to locate the information and would post the results to the
customer’s online account in violation of the Telecommunications
Act.46 Although Accusearch was aware that the records were obtained
illegally, it claimed immunity under § 230.47
In an opinion that largely mirrors Roommates.com, the Tenth
Circuit determined that Accusearch was responsible for the “development” of the records that it supplied to customers, rendering it a
content provider under § 230(f)(3). The court construed the word
“develop” to mean “the act of drawing something out, making it

42

In Roommates.com, the Ninth Circuit noted that “Roommate both elicits the
allegedly illegal content and makes aggressive use of it in conducting its business.”
Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d
1157, 1172 (9th Cir. 2008). For further discussion of how the purposes and uses of
the defendant’s Web site influenced the Ninth Circuit’s decision, see Varty
Defterderian, Note, Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com: A New Path for Section
230 Immunity, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 563 (2009).
43
Woodhull v. Meinel, 202 P.3d 126, 129 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008).
44
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2009).
45
Id. at 1191-92.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 1199.
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‘visible,’ ‘active,’ or ‘useable’”48 and stated that a service provider is
“responsible” for the development of offensive content “only if it in
some way specifically encourages development of what is offensive
about the content.”49 According to the court, Accusearch did exactly
that when it exposed the confidential telephone records to public view
on Abika.com.50 Even though the content itself was provided by thirdparty researchers, Accusearch could not claim § 230 immunity.
Two aspects of the Tenth Circuit’s analysis are particularly
significant. First, the court distinguishes its earlier decision in Ben Ezra,
Weinstein, & Co. v. America Online Inc.,51 where a publicly traded
corporation sued America Online for posting inaccurate information
about its stock, information that America Online had purchased from
a third-party vendor. The court points out that the offending content
in Ben Ezra had been “erroneous stock quotations and, unsurprisingly,
America Online did not solicit the errors.”52 The critical factor in
Accusearch thus appears to be the defendant’s solicitation of the
confidential telephone records. Second, the court asserts that
“Accusearch’s responsibility is more pronounced than that of Roommates.com. Roommates.com may have encouraged users to post
offending content; but the offensive postings were Accusearch's raison
d'etre and it affirmatively solicited them.”53 Thus, the Accusearch court
believed it was applying the underlying illegality test more narrowly
than the Ninth Circuit did in Roommates.com. Its characterization of
the Roommates.com scenario focused on the fact that the defendant’s
conduct in that case represents the minimum level of “development”
that will remove § 230 immunity.

48
49
50
51

Id. at 1198.
Id. at 1199.
Id.
Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir.

2000).
52
53

Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1199.
Id. at 1200.
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V. THE INDUCEMENT APPROACH
Most of the § 230 cases decided since Roommates.com seem to fit
within the general framework of a solicitation-based standard. At least
one case, however, has taken a markedly different approach. In NPS
LLC v. StubHub, Inc.,54 a Massachusetts district court applied a much
broader interpretation of Roommates.com that would deny immunity to
those whose actions appear to have “induced” the creation or
development of illegal content. This “inducement” does not require an
actual request and can occur even when third parties retain unfettered
discretion over the nature of the content. Though the exact contours
of the theory are far from clear, liability under an inducement standard
is based on a vague determination that the defendant’s actions
influenced a third party’s decision to post illegal content.55
A. Evidence of a Broader Interpretation: NPS v. StubHub
In NPS v. StubHub, the New England Patriots brought suit against
StubHub alleging tortious interference with its contractual
relationships with season ticket holders.56 StubHub operated a Web
site that allowed users to buy and sell tickets to sporting, concert,
theater, and other live entertainment events.57 Although Patriots
tickets were non-transferrable and the organization prohibited unauthorized exchanges, many ticket holders chose to sell their tickets
through the defendant’s Web site, often at prices greatly exceeding face
value.58 StubHub did not buy or sell tickets directly but it did profit
from the transactions, charging a 15% commission to the seller and
10% to the buyer.59

54

NPS LLC v. StubHub, Inc., 2009 WL 995483 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Jan. 26, 2009).
See, e.g. Zac Locke, Asking for It: A Grokster-Based Approach to Internet Sites That
Distribute Offensive Content, 18 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 151 (2008)
(discussing how the Grokster inducement test might be applied in § 230 cases).
56
NPS LLC v. StubHub, Inc., 2009 WL 995483 at *4.
57
Id. at *2.
58
Id.
59
Id.
55
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StubHub also facilitated these ticket sales in a number of ways. For
instance, it offered a limited guarantee against voided tickets.60 It also
created a special category of sellers, called “LargeSellers,” for those who
purchased large quantities of tickets and later resold them at a profit.61
StubHub allowed these users to purchase tickets without the normal
10% fee and also urged them to “check the website from time to time
for underpriced tickets or exclusive listings that may not be seen
elsewhere.”62 StubHub even allowed these users to “mask” the ticket
location by listing a seat up to five rows away, making it impossible for
the Patriots to determine, based solely on the listings, which ticket
holders were selling their tickets.63
The effect of these measures was to increase the asking price for
each ticket, resulting in larger commissions.64 By taking advantage of
these features, however, LargeSellers almost invariably ran afoul of a
Massachusetts anti-scalping law, which generally forbade the reselling
of tickets at above face value.65 Hence, listings with inflated ticket
prices constituted illegal third-party content, which, according to the
Patriots, satisfied the “improper means” element of its tortious
interference claim.66 StubHub countered with a § 230 defense.67
Applying the rule from Roommates.com without discussion, the
court states that “the same evidence of knowing participation . . .
sufficient . . . to establish improper means is also sufficient” to deny
immunity.68 As stated earlier in the opinion, improper means could be
shown if StubHub either intentionally induced or encouraged others
to violate the anti-scalping law, or profited from such violations while
declining to stop or limit them,69 a direct reference to the Grokster70
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

Id.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *11.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, §§185A, 185D (West 2002).
NPS LLC v. StubHub, Inc., 2009 WL 995483, at *10 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Jan. 26,

2009).
67
68
69

Id. at *12.
Id.
Id. at *10.
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standards for contributory infringement71 and vicarious infringement,
respectively.
According to the court, StubHub “intentionally induced or encouraged” LargeSellers to violate the anti-scalping law when it “strongly
urged” them to check the Web site for underpriced tickets and offered
to waive the 10% fee.72 By virtue of its commission system, StubHub
also profited when tickets were sold for more than face value, and it
declined to stop or limit this activity because it did not require sellers
to list the face value of the ticket, making it impossible to know
whether the law was being violated.73
These actions were enough to take StubHub outside the scope of §
230. Because the opinion itself only purports to decide the immunity
issue based on the “same evidence,” and not necessarily the same
standard, as the improper means issue, one cannot conclusively say
that Grokster is responsible for the result. Based on the facts alone,
however, the court’s interpretation of the underlying illegality test is a
clear departure from the prior narrow interpretations of Roommates.com.
While the StubHub decision itself may not carry much precedential
weight, it could be a preview of how the underlying illegality test will
be applied by courts eager to establish limits on § 230 immunity.74 The
70

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
“[O]ne who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to
infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to
foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.”
Id. at 936-937. For a discussion on the impact such a standard would have on § 230
jurisprudence, see Varty Defterderian, Note, Fair Housing Council v.
Roommates.com: A New Path for Section 230 Immunity, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 563
(2009).
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NPS LLC v. StubHub, Inc., 2009 WL 995483, at *11 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Jan. 26,
2009).
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Id. at *11. It is worth noting that StubHub displayed the text of the
Massachusetts anti-scalping law on its “Q & A” page. See Id. at *2.
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An inducement-based approach appears in another case as well, though not as
an interpretation of the Roommates.com exception. In People v. Gourlay, 2009 WL
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Seventh Circuit in particular has shown some hostility toward
expansive readings of the statute and its decision in Chicago Lawyers’
Committee v. Craigslist75 even indicates that Grokster would apply in the
context of § 230 as well.76 The inducement standard would represent a
natural extension of this theory. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit itself
is gaining a reputation for its willingness to deny § 230 protection. If
called upon to clarify its holding in Roommates.com, the court may be
inclined to follow an inducement-based approach.
B. Distinguishing Inducement from Solicitation
As is readily apparent from the StubHub case, inducement differs
from solicitation in at least two important respects: it requires no
explicit request and can occur even when users have been given the
option of posting legal content.
First, a Web site operator can be liable under an inducement
standard without making any explicit statements or requests. StubHub
never requested that its users increase the price of the tickets they sold;
indeed, the Web site’s user agreement expressly required sellers to
comply with all applicable laws when setting their prices.77 The second
key difference is that, under inducement, a Web site operator can still
be considered a “developer” of user-generated content even if users
have the option of posting legal content. In StubHub, the Web site had
Internet. The defendant appealed, arguing that 47 U.S.C. § 230 preempted his
conviction because he had not created or developed the pornographic content. In
dismissing this claim, the court noted that the offense required proof that he had
“persuade[d], induce[d], entice[d], coerce[d], cause[d], or knowingly allowe[d]” a child
to engage in a sexually abusive activity. Id. at *4. Because of this, the court concluded,
a defendant who has committed the offense has necessarily placed himself outside
the scope of § 230 immunity. Id. at *5. Though based on a Michigan criminal statute,
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.145c(2) (West 2004), the analysis in Gourlay would
seem to permit a loss of immunity even in cases of “persuasion,” a far cry from the
rigorous requirements of the solicitation theory.
75
Chicago Lawyer’s Comm. For Civil Rights Under Law, Inc., v. Craigslist, Inc.,
519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008).
76
Id. at 670.
77
NPS LLC v. StubHub, Inc., 2009 WL 995483, at *11 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Jan. 26,
2009).
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“developed” the illegal ticket prices even though its users remained
entirely free to engage in legitimate ticket sales.
These two features demonstrate the relatively tenuous causal
relationship capable of triggering liability under an inducement standard. Because of these differences, the inducement standard carves out
a much larger exception to the protections available under § 230.
C. Key Considerations Under an Inducement Standard
When evaluating claims under an inducement standard, a court
might focus on the specific actions of a defendant, the intent behind
those actions, and the influence they exert on a third-party’s decision
to produce illegal content. There must some cognizable act by the
defendant to support a denial of immunity, but this act need not be an
actual request for unlawful content. 78 A plaintiff would also need to
demonstrate that the act was driven by an illegal intent.79 This intent
can be inferred from context, particularly when a Web site’s revenue
depends on the particular choices that its users make. 80
Perhaps most importantly, the defendant’s actions must in some
way influence a third party’s decision to develop content that is
unlawful. Although the discussion in StubHub offers little guidance on
this point, the facts of the case help to identify three categories of
behavior that may be problematic. The first involves creating financial
incentives for others to produce illegal material,81 such as the special
78

See, e.g., Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 421 (1st
Cir. 2007) (“Even assuming arguendo that active inducement could negate Section
230 immunity, it is clear that UCS has not alleged any acts by Lycos that come even
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People v. Gourlay, 2009 WL 529216, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. March 3, 2009)
(“[W]hen a person persuades, induces, entices, or coerces another, the person is
actively and intentionally attempting to bring about a particular action or result.”).
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Hattie Harman, Drop-Down Lists and the Communication Decency Act: A Creation
Conundrum, 43 IND. L. REV. 143, 172-173 (2009).
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See, e.g., Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 966 (N.D. Ill. 2009)
(“Nothing in the service craigslist offers induces anyone to post any particular listing
or express a preference for discrimination; for example, craigslist does not offer a
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discount given to LargeSellers in StubHub. Another category involves
reducing the risk of detection for users who commit illegal acts.
Although not specifically mentioned in the court’s analysis, the ability
of StubHub users to “mask” the location of their seats would fall under
this category. Other examples may include guarantees of anonymity
offered by “repu-taint” Web sites.82 A third category covers instances
where a Web site operator provides suggestions or examples of illegal
content for its users to emulate,83 although it is unclear whether this
alone could sufficiently influence a user’s behavior. StubHub may offer
an example from this category as well, as the court found it significant
that the defendant had “strongly urged” LargeSellers to check the
listings for underpriced tickets. Beyond these general observations,
however, the contours of an inducement standard remain unclear.
CONCLUSION
Cases decided in the wake of Roomates.com seem to reflect two
different standards for determining when the “underlying illegality”
test is satisfied. Most courts apply a “solicitation” standard, requiring
the Web site operator to explicitly request the offending material. This
request must be specific enough that compliance with its terms would
almost necessarily entail providing illegal content. An “inducement”
standard, on the other hand, could deprive a Web site operator of
immunity even when its users retain a significant degree of control
over the illicit nature of the posted content. Inducement describes
conduct that influences a third party’s decision to develop illegal
material, either by creating financial incentives, reducing the risk of
detection, or perhaps offering examples for third parties to emulate.
Liability will not attach under either standard however, unless the
lower price to people who include discriminatory statements in their postings.”)
(citing Chicago Lawyer’s Comm. For Civil Rights Under Law, Inc., v. Craigslist, Inc.,
519 F.3d 666, 671-72 (7th Cir. 2008)).
82
See Patricia Sánchez Abril , Repu-Taint Sites and the Limits of § 230 Immunity, J.
INTERNET L., Jan. 2009, at 3 (explaining that a “repu-taint” Web site is one that
encourages users to post sensitive information about others without regard for the
disclosure’s veracity or consequences.).
83
Id.
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defendant harbored an illegal intent, which often must be inferred
from context. Despite indications that some courts might be willing to
adopt a broader interpretation of Roommates.com, the weight of
authority continues to support strong protections for Web site
operators.
PRACTICE POINTERS


Regardless of how broadly a court may interpret the Roommates.com
exception, a plaintiff will still need to establish that the Web site
operator intended for its users to produce unlawful content and
that it took specific action to bring about that result.



Under a narrower “solicitation” standard, defendants will generally
be entitled to § 230 immunity unless their actions amount to an
explicit request that is specifically limited to illegal material.



Under a broader “inducement”-type standard, a plaintiff may be
able to overcome a § 230 defense by merely showing that the
defendant’s actions in some way influenced a third party’s decision
to produce illegal content.



To reduce exposure, Web site operators should examine their fee
structures or pricing policies to ensure that they do not create
financial incentives for unlawful behavior. Any sample content or
recommendations to users should be removed if they might tend
to suggest an illegal course of action.

